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INTRODUCTION
Grimsby, a small city on Northern England’s east coast, was once the 
largest fishing port in the world.1 But as the United Kingdom’s fishing 
industry collapsed, so did Grimsby’s economy.2 Skint, a documentary 
series about unemployed and impoverished Brits, filmed its second season 
in Grimsby; the city was also lampooned in Sacha Baron Cohen’s 2016 
comedy, The Brothers Grimsby. However, as offshore wind farms have 
sprung up off the city’s coast over the past decade, its economy has 
boomed.3 Seven offshore wind farms currently sit off the coast of 
Grimsby, generating over 1 gigawatt (GW) of energy, and what is 
projected to be the largest wind farm in the world is under construction. 
The wind farms, initially feared as the final blow for the city’s struggling 
fish industry, have become an economic savior.4 The once-desolate port 
now bustles with construction vessels and smaller ships transporting 
technicians out to the farms.5 Ørsted, the largest offshore wind developer 
in the world, is building a new offshore wind manufacturing facility that 
will bring a slew of new jobs to the area and likely give Grimsby a new 
title: the largest offshore wind maintenance and operations hub in the 
world.6
Offshore wind could be a boon for America’s coastal states as well, as 
the U.S. stands to harness not just copious amounts of renewable energy 
but also offshore wind’s economic potential. The Department of Energy 
(DOE) estimates that the industry could support 34,000 jobs by 2020 and 
up to 181,000 by 2050.7 Approximately 2,058 GWs could be captured with 
current technology, but the DOE estimates up to 10,800 GWs could be 
generated “within the 200 nautical miles Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ)”—nearly double the national consumption rate.8 However, with 
                                                                                                            
1. Alan Middleton, Grimsby’s fishing heritage, LINCOLNSHIRE LIFE (Jan. 
2013), https://perma.cc/WBC5-BKXY.
2. Chris Bentley, For A Vision of Offshore Wind in New England, Look to 
the U.K., WBUR (Jan. 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/7825-BUY7.
3. Chris Bentley, Offshore wind projects breathe life into struggling UK 
ports, PRI’S THE WORLD (Feb. 14, 2018, 1:30 pm), https://perma.cc/GC4K-
2Y7H.
4. Bentley, supra note 2.
5. Bentley, supra note 3.
6. Id.
7. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, NATIONAL OFFSHORE WIND STRATEGY 22
(2016).
8. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE 
BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT’S RENEWABLE ENERGY 
AUTHORIZATION PROCESS 2 (2016).
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only one operating farm nation-wide, offshore wind development in the 
U.S. has been widely considered a missed opportunity.9
The U.K., on the other hand, is the world leader in offshore wind 
production.10 The country generates 6.84 GW of offshore wind capacity 
(out of 18.81 GW capacity worldwide, or just over 36% of global 
capacity)11 and constructed 53% of Europe’s new capacity in 2017.12 Its 
offshore wind prices are at a record low, with contracts for 2022-23 
awarded for £57.50 ($75.86) per megawatt hour (MWh). The industry 
employs over 230,000 people, has a yearly turnover of £43 billion, and is 
expected to bring another £17.5 billion in investments to the country as 
prices continue to drop.13
How has the U.K. become so successful, and what lessons could the 
U.S. learn from its approach? This Article aims to answers this question 
by first looking at the current U.S. offshore market and the current federal 
and state policies. It will then discuss the U.K.’s policy framework and 
analyze what approaches have made its offshore wind market thrive. 
Lastly, the two frameworks will be compared, and lessons will be gleaned 
from the U.K.’s success. 
I. THE U.S. POLICY FRAMEWORK
A. Leasing and Regulation
The U.S. framework for offshore wind development is largely 
governed by the Energy Policy Act (EPAct) of 2005.14 Entitled 
“Alternative Energy-Related Uses on the Outer Continental Shelf,”
Section 388 of the EPAct provides the Secretary of the Interior (“the 
Secretary”) the power to grant “a lease, easement, or right-of-way on the 
Outer Continental Shelf” for offshore wind projects.15 The Secretary has a 
bevy of obligations that come with this power, including obligations to: 
                                                                                                            
9. Jeremy Firestone, Legal Framework to Develop Offshore Wind Power in 
United States, THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
FOR THE PROMOTION OF OFFSHORE WIND POWER 145, (Anton Ming-Zhi Gao & 
Chien-Te Fan eds., 2017).
10. GLOBAL WIND ENERGY COUNCIL, GLOBAL WIND STATISTICS 2017 4 (2018).
11. Id. at 3.
12. Adam Vaughn, UK build half of Europe’s offshore wind power in 2017,
THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 6, 2018), https://perma.cc/ET7V-6ED4.
13. Jillian Ambrose, Offshore wind to power £17.5bn investment boom as costs 
halve, THE TELEGRAPH (Sept. 11, 2017, 8:04 AM), https://perma.cc/U7W3-8AAJ.
14. Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. § 388 (2005).
15. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, sec. 338(a), § 1337(p)(1), 
119 Stat. 594, 744.
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x ensure the project properly plans for safety and environmental 
concerns (including environmental protection, waste prevention, 
and conservation of natural resources);16
x coordinate with “relevant Federal agencies” and interests 
(including “national security interests,” the Secretary of the 
Coast Guard, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of 
Commerce, and “heads of other relevant departments and 
agencies”);17
x coordinate with the public and states (including providing public 
notice and comment, respecting “correlative rights” and other 
“reasonable uses” of the seabed and the lease area, and 
coordinating with any state or local governments affected by the 
process);18
x provide “oversight, inspection, research, monitoring, and 
enforcement”;19 and
x ensure “a fair return” for the U.S. through the establishment of 
“royalties, fees, rentals, bonuses, or other payments.”20
The Secretary has delegated the implementation of offshore wind leasing 
and construction to the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM). 21
The BOEM manages 1.7 billion acres of federal submerged lands, starting 
three nautical miles from the coast in most cases and stretching to the 
EEZ.22
Under the Renewable Energy Program regulations finalized in 2009,23
the BOEM has a four-stage process for commercial offshore wind leasing: 
(1) Planning and Analysis (~two years), (2) Leasing (~one to two years), 
(3) Site Assessment (up to five years), and (4) Construction and 
Operations (~two years plus the lease term).24 In the Planning and Analysis 
                                                                                                            
16. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, sec. 388(a), § 1337(p)(4), 
119 Stat. 594, 745.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, sec. 338(a), § 
1337(p)(2)(A), 119 Stat. 594, 745.
21. Firestone, supra note 9, at 147.
22. A Citizen’s Guide, supra note 8, at 3; Federal Offshore Lands, BUREAU 
OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT, https://perma.cc/9WJS-J44X (last visited 
May 9, 2018). The EEZ is the offshore area up to 200 nautical miles from U.S. 
territories, claimed by the U.S. as prescribed by UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea.
23. Firestone, supra note 9, at 154.
24. Fact Sheet: Wind Energy Commercial Leasing Process, BUREAU OF 
OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT 1-2 (Jan. 24, 2017), https://perma.cc/2LCS-2U3G; 
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phase, the BOEM identifies potential project sites, engages stakeholders, 
consults relevant agencies and governments, and conducts an 
environmental compliance review.25 In the Leasing phase, the BOEM 
determines whether it will issue the lease through a competitive or non-
competitive process and ultimately grants a lease providing the exclusive 
right to assess the site and later seek BOEM approval for development.26
Once granted, the Site Assessment phase begins—the lessee creates a Site 
Assessment Plan (SAP) and submits it to the BOEM, who decides if the 
plan is technically and environmentally sound.27 If approved, the lessee 
conducts the SAP, as well as any “site characterization surveys and studies 
(e.g., avian, marine mammal, archeological).”28 Lastly, in the Construction 
and Operations phase, the lessee submits a detailed Construction and 
Operations Plan to the BOEM for approval.29 If approved, lessees finally 
begin construction. In this phase, the BOEM also requires the submission
of a decommissioning plan before the end of the lease term.30 Throughout 
the entire process, the BOEM consults with the Intergovernmental 
Renewable Energy Task Force of any affected state, which are state-level 
organizations that provide a state voice in the offshore leasing process.31
Figure 1.1 The BOEM’s Four-Phase Wind Energy Commercial Leasing Process32
                                                                                                            
Regulatory Roadmap, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT, https://perma
.cc/26KL-GLLS (last visited May 12, 2018). See Figure 1.1.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Fact Sheet, supra note 24, at 2.
31. Id. at 1. Fourteen states have Task Forces: California, Delaware, Florida, 
Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, North 
Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Virginia. Id.
32. Id.
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A web of other agencies are involved in the development of an 
offshore wind project and handle either regulatory or research-oriented 
pieces of the puzzle.33 The physical process of offshore construction and 
navigation implicates the Coast Guard, which controls “commercial 
shipping fairways and traffic separation schemes;” the Army Corps of 
Engineers, which handles “obstructions to navigation, dredging and filing, 
and sand mining;” as well as the Navy, which controls “training and 
testing” and is charged with protecting submarine cables.34 Wildlife 
concerns are addressed by both the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA), which is charged with protecting “marine 
mammals, endangered species, sea turtles, commercial and recreational 
fisheries, [and] marine aquaculture,” and the Fish and Wildlife Service, 
which protects “migratory birds, marine mammals, endangered species, 
[and] sea turtles.”35 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which 
monitors “air discharge from service vehicles” and the climate generally,
is also implicated by offshore projects.36
Offshore wind projects may also trigger, less directly, the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the Federal Aviation 
Administration (if the project will obstruct aircraft), and the National Park 
Service (NPS) (if the project will conflict with the NPS’s “mandate to 
conserve the scenery”).37 The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
(NEPA), which governs environmental impact statements, requires federal 
agencies—such as those involved in the offshore wind project approval 
process—to consider environmental impacts before taking action.38 NEPA 
doesn’t require a specific outcome, but it is designed to facilitate 
communication between federal agencies throughout the process.39
B. Incentives and Industry Development
While the BOEM regulates federal offshore leases, it does not have to 
promote offshore wind—that role belongs to the DOE.40 Since 2011, the 
DOE has funneled “over $200 million to offshore wind research and 
development projects for technology development and market barrier 
                                                                                                            
33. Firestone, supra note 9, at 148.
34. Id. (internal citations omitted).
35. Id. (internal citations omitted).
36. Id. (internal citations omitted).
37. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
38. Firestone, supra note 9, at 155.
39. Id.
40. Firestone, supra note 9, at 147.
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removal, as well as advanced technology demonstration.”41 The market 
barriers the DOE has tackled thus far include limiting offshore wind’s 
environmental impact, linking offshore turbines to the national grid, 
analyzing the nation’s ability to support an offshore supply chain, and 
gathering offshore wind resource data.42
Federal incentives for wind energy development mainly consist of the 
production tax credit (PTC), measured per kilowatt hour (KWh), and the 
incentive tax credit (ITC), which is “based on a percentage of capital cost 
expenditures.”43 Congress has authorized both incentives intermittently, 
but only for one-to-two year periods before they require re-authorization.44
They have often lapsed during this wait time, although Congress has made 
them retroactive.45 Given an offshore wind project’s five-to-seven-year 
timeline, this uncertainty has been counter-productive to incentivizing 
growth.46 In 2015, Congress enacted a “five-year wind power PTC with a 
phasedown in recognition of the increasing cost parity of land-based 
wind.”47 Projects must commence construction by December 31, 2019 in 
order to qualify for either tax credit.48 The federal government also offers 
loan guarantees, but these have been under-utilized.49
There were concerns that offshore wind, and renewables generally, 
would suffer under the Trump administration. Trump had previously 
claimed climate change was a Chinese hoax meant to destabilize U.S. 
manufacturing,50 pulled out of the Paris Agreement, and pandered to coal 
groups throughout his campaign.51 He also waged a long-time battle 
against a planned offshore wind farm near his Scottish golf course, mainly 
based on aesthetic grounds.52 The conflict resulted in a series of tweets on 
offshore wind, where Trump called wind turbines an “environmental [and]
                                                                                                            
41. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY WIND ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES OFFICE,
OFFSHORE WIND INITIATIVES AT THE U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY 1 (2017).
42. Id.
43. Firestone, supra note 9, at 152.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 153.
48. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ADVANCING THE GROWTH OF THE U.S. WIND 
INDUSTRY: FEDERAL INCENTIVES, FUNDING, AND PARTNERSHIP OPPORTUNITIES
1-2 (2017).
49. Firestone, supra note 9, at 153.
50. @realDonaldTrump, TWITTER (Nov. 6, 2012, 1:15 PM), https://perma.cc
/HGH7-HC49 (“The concept of global warming was created by and for the
Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive.”).
51. Michael Reilly, Trump Once Railed Against Offshore Wind but Is Now 
Embracing It, MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (Apr. 10, 2017), https://perma.cc/CL5Y-
6X74.
52. Id.
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aesthetic disaster,” blamed them for killing bald eagles,53 and stated that if 
“Obama keeps pushing wind turbines[,] our country will go down the 
tubes economically, environmentally[, and] aesthetically.”54 He continued 
to push the issue after his election, urging U.K. politician Nigel Farage to 
oppose offshore wind during their first meeting.55
These fears have been assuaged, beginning with a late-2017
announcement that the DOE would push an additional $18.5 million 
toward “an offshore wind research and development consortium” with the 
mission of decreasing costs through “technology advancement, resource 
and physical site characterization[,] . . . and supply chain technology 
solutions,” along with $2 million for further research at the DOE’s existing 
labs.56 Secretary of Interior Ryan Zinke spoke at the International Offshore 
Wind Partnering Forum in April 2018, calling for “increased offshore 
wind development along the U.S. Atlantic coast”57 and stating that the 
Trump administration “supports an all-of-the-above energy policy and 
using every tool available to achieve American energy dominance.”58 As 
the BOEM’s energy policy counselor stated, “the outlook for offshore 
wind is bright.”59
II. THE STATE OF THE U.S. OFFSHORE MARKET
The U.S. offshore wind industry, after decades of little development, 
appears to be gaining traction, with federal support supplementing a surge 
in activity by Northeast states. The BOEM has awarded thirteen offshore 
leases on the Atlantic coast, and it announced two new proposed lease 
sales off Massachusetts in April 2018.60 It is also seeking lease 
                                                                                                            
53. @realDonaldTrump, TWITTER (Aug. 24, 2012, 4:55 PM), https://perma
.cc/FVN8-EEDF (“It’s Friday. How many bald eagles did wind turbines kill 
today? They are an environmental & aesthetic disaster.”).
54. @realDonaldTrump, TWITTER (Oct. 17, 2012, 12:53 PM), https://perma
.cc/KSU5-J3UA.
55. Reilly, supra note 51.
56. Secretary of Energy Rick Perry Announces $18.5 Million for Offshore 
Wind Research, DEP’T OF ENERGY (Dec. 12, 2017), https://perma.cc/Z6Q6-
WNCM (last visited May 10, 2018).
57. Raya B. Treiser et al., Infrastructure Series: Momentum Builds for 
Offshore Wind Energy Development in the United States, WILMER HALE (Apr. 19, 
2018), https://perma.cc/784V-X2LG.
58. Jason Deign, The US Wind Sector Toasts Trump’s New Love of Offshore,
GREEN TECH MEDIA (Apr. 11, 2018), https://perma.cc/FGK3-YYWW. 
59. Id.
60. Id.; see also Lease and Grant Information, BOEM, https://perma.cc
/F4VR-STLK (last visited May 10, 2018), (listing leases issued off the coasts of 
Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Virginia, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, North 
Carolina, Delaware, and Florida).
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nominations for the New York Bight, a shallow area between Long Island 
and the New Jersey coast.61
United States’ projects currently in development would generate 13
GW of power.62 One notable development is “Constitution Wind,” a
recently-announced project off the coast of Connecticut proposed by Bay 
State Wind (a joint venture between the New England-based provider 
Eversource and the Danish-based producer Ørsted).63 The Constitution 
Wind project, with a 200 MW capacity, will share the same federal lease 
as the venture’s existing Bay State Wind project, which has a planned 800 
MW capacity—bringing the venture’s total lease production to 1 GW.64
Other active leases span the Atlantic coast, including areas off Virginia, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and 
North Carolina.65
A decline in the cost of offshore wind production has partly 
contributed to this surge, and prices are forecasted to continue dropping.66
One recent study estimated that offshore wind energy could be sold for as 
little as $100-110 per MWh in the Northeast United States, which is close 
to the total cost of constructing an offshore farm in the area, based on 
prices awarded in recent auctions.67 Block Island’s production was sold 
for $244 per MWh in 2016, Skipjack and Ocean City dropped to $137 per 
MWh in 2017,68 and Maryland paid $132 per MWh in 2017 for 386 MWs 
scheduled to come online in 2020.69 Projections estimate that prices will 
drop to $80 per MWh in some regions—bringing the price for offshore 
wind closer to the $50 per MWh wholesale energy price forecasted for the 
Northeast.70
                                                                                                            
61. Deign, supra note 58.
62. Tom Johnson, Moody’s likes the look of NJ, other Northeastern states, 
for offshore wind, NJ SPOTLIGHT (Apr. 2, 2018), https://perma.cc/P73D-6PE4.
63. Joshua S. Hill, Ørsted & Eversource Announce 200 Megawatt 
Connecticut Offshore Wind Farm, CLEAN TECHNICA (Apr. 3, 2018), https://per
ma.cc/7KRR-A5MZ. 
64. Id.
65. Lease and Grant Information, BOEM, https://perma.cc/8SH8-DJML
(last visited May 12, 2018).
66. David Foxwell, Offshore wind ‘poised to take off’ in the US northeast,
OFFSHORE WIND JOURNAL (Apr. 3, 2018), https://perma.cc/53PY-CLSR.
67. Mike O’Boyle, Is Offshore Wind About to Hit Competitiveness in New 
York and New England?, FORBES (May 2, 2018, 7:55 AM), https://perma.cc/
SY3X-GUGW.
68. Foxwell, supra note 66.
69. O’Boyle, supra note 67.
70. Foxwell, supra note 66.
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III. U.S. STATE-LEVEL ACTION
Most of the push for offshore wind thus far has originated at the state 
level.71 Some states have passed legislation requiring or encouraging the 
development of offshore wind: A Massachusetts law requiring 1,600 MW 
to be drawn from offshore wind is ramping up,72 and New York’s Offshore 
Wind Master Plan aims to have “2.4 GWs of capacity by 2030, which the 
state expects will deliver 5,000 jobs.”73
State-level policies, or obstructions, have played a key role in offshore 
wind development. The U.S. has had two high-profile offshore projects 
over the past two decades: Cape Wind, an embattled project sited in the 
Nantucket Sound that never materialized, and Block Island, the first 
operational offshore wind farm in the United States. While Cape Wind is 
a cautionary tale, Block Island illustrates the power of state policies to 
make offshore wind farms in the U.S. a reality. 
A. Cape Wind
While Block Island holds the title of the first offshore wind farm in 
the U.S., Cape Wind may be the most notorious. The project was the 
brainchild of Jim Gordon, the president of Energy Management Inc., who 
entered the renewable energy market with a desire to combat U.S. 
dependency on foreign oil.74 Cape Wind was initially planned to have 130 
turbines in a 25-square-mile area of the Nantucket Sound, which would 
produce enough electricity to power 200,000 homes.75 Gordon once 
envisioned Cape Wind kicking off a surge of offshore wind farms on the 
East Coast, but after investing $100 million of his own money and sixteen
years of time, the project finally relinquished its lease to the BOEM in 
December 2017.76
Cape Wind faced broad, relentless, and deep-pocketed opposition. 
Siting was the central issue—the lease was bordered by Cape Cod, 
                                                                                                            
71. Deign, supra note 58.
72. Brady Dennis, The nation’s first offshore wind farm is ready to go, despite 
critics’ blowback, THE WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 27, 2016), https://perma.cc/
FB2H-7CD4.
73. Deign, supra note 58.
74. Katharine Q. Seelye, After 16 Years, Hopes for Cape Cod Wind Farm 
Float Away, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 19, 2017), https://perma.cc/E9RD-
MZBX.
75. Brian Eckhouse & Joe Ryan, What Was Once Hailed as First U.S. Offshore 
Wind Farm Is No More, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 2, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www
.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-01/cape-wind-developer-terminates-pro
ject-opposed-by-kennedys-koch.
76. Seelye, supra note 74.
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Nantucket, and Martha’s Vineyard, making it visible to wealthy 
landowners including the Kennedys; William I. Koch, a fossil-fuel made 
billionaire; and “Rachel Lambert Mellon, the heiress and philanthropist 
[known] as Bunny.”77 Aesthetics were not the only problem—”local 
officials, business owners, fisherman, Indian tribes, and residents cited the 
high cost of offshore wind power, navigational hazards and threats to the 
environment” as concerns.78 The Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, led 
by Mr. Koch, claimed the project was a land grab by a private developer 
and vowed to stop the project in its tracks.79 His efforts may have made 
Cape Wind the most litigated wind project in the world.80 Koch’s Alliance 
spent over $40 million delaying the project through the court system.81
Administrative hearings and contentious litigation frustrated permitting 
attempts and repeatedly stalled the project.82 The lawsuits focused on a 
plethora of factors, including the project’s environmental impact study, 
“construction permit, historic preservation, endangered species, and 
impacts on aircraft.”83
Litigation is not the only reason for Cape Wind’s failure. The project 
commenced prior to the EPAct, and thus was not conceived under the 
current U.S. framework.84 Army Corps of Engineers initially oversaw the 
permitting process, but the Department of the Interior transferred this duty 
to the Minerals Management Service (MMS) after the passage of the 
EPAct in 2005.85 After the MMS conducted extensive environmental 
studies, Cape Wind received the U.S.’s first offshore wind development 
lease in 2010.86 Therefore, Cape Wind did not go through the BOEM’s 
siting and leasing process that likely would have avoided conflicts with 
rich landowners entirely. Also, Cape Wind’s site was unique in that it sat 
in federal waters located in a sound surrounded by state waters and 
islands.87 It was also in one of the few federally-controlled waters where 
the federal fish population is managed by the state.88 This location 
complicated the permitting process, giving opposition groups more 
opportunities to frustrate the project.
                                                                                                            
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Firestone, supra note 9, at 156.
81. Seelye, supra note 74.
82. ERNEST E. SMITH ET AL., WIND LAW § 9.03 (2017).
83. Firestone, supra note 9, at 156.
84. SMITH ET AL., supra note 82.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Firestone, supra note 9, at 156.
88. Id.
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Ultimately, securing a market for the wind energy proved to be the 
project’s downfall. Although it survived the legal onslaught, in 2015,
several local utilities cancelled their power purchasing agreements (PPAs) 
with Energy Management Inc. due to the developer’s inability to meet 
contractual deadlines.89 Gordon could not obtain permission to construct a 
transmission line to transmit the wind power to land and was excluded 
from a Massachusetts program that required state utilities to contract for 
offshore wind energy.90 The Cape Wind saga illustrates the dangers of 
poor siting and the importance of engaging stakeholders early and often, 
but the key lesson for other developers is to avoid building “within sight 
of shore.”91
B. Block Island
Block Island, off the coast of Rhode Island, is the site of the nation’s 
first offshore wind farm.92 The project provides 30 MWs to New 
England’s grid, estimated to power 17,000 homes.93 Providence-based 
Deepwater Wind was the first to clear the many hurdles involved in an 
offshore wind project, but Rhode Island’s policy framework was 
instrumental in making Block Island a reality.94 Three specific policies 
were key to Block Island’s success: 
the Renewable Energy Standard (RES), which established clean 
energy use requirements; the Ocean Special Area Management Plan 
(SAMP), which produced a comprehensive ocean plan protecting 
existing resources and uses of the ocean areas under the state’s 
jurisdiction; and the Long-Term Contracting Standard for Renewable 
Energy, which mandates [PPAs] with clean energy developers and 
creates specific mechanisms for offshore wind.95
The RES mandates that the state’s electricity mix must contain 38.5% 
renewable-generated electricity by 2035 and sets a goal for annual 
incremental increases.96 The state quickly realized that, to meet this goal, 
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it would need offshore wind capacity.97 Block Island’s site emerged as a 
strong option for a pilot project, as it was the most cost-effective per MWh, 
large enough to meet the RES goal, and capable of providing much-needed 
power to Block Island, which is not connected to the state’s grid and 
previously relied on diesel generators.98
Once the project took form, the Rhode Island Coastal Resources 
Management Council engaged in a marine spatial planning process under 
the authority of the Coastal Zone Management Action (CZMA) to ensure 
that offshore wind would have a place in the existing myriad uses of the 
state’s waters.99 The resulting Ocean Special Area Management Plan 
(SAMP) was carefully crafted to comply with state, federal, and tribal 
regulations, as well as account for stakeholders as diverse as 
“conservationists, fishermen, shippers, coastal-property owners, and the 
Narragansett Indian Tribe.”100 The two-year process engaged this wide 
array of interests and settled on the project’s current site because of its 
reliable winds and minimal conflicts with existing ocean uses.101 The data 
compiled by the SAMP sped up Deepwater’s progress on the project, 
assisting with clearing the regulations of no less than “10 distinct state and 
federal agencies” and easing potential friction with stakeholders.102
As the SAMP process occurred, the state legislature adopted the Long-
Term Contracting Standard for Renewable Energy.103 It promulgated three 
key provisions providing stability for the Block Island project and the 
state’s future offshore wind market: “[F]irst, it required that electric power 
distributors solicit 10-to-15 year contracts for renewable energy proposals 
annually until at least 90 MW of clean energy generation were locked in 
under long-term contract.” Second, it mandated the state’s main retail 
electricity utility to enter a PPA for Block Island and assist with laying the 
cables to connect the project, and the Island itself, to the state’s grid.
Lastly, it granted the state utilities commission the power to mandate long-
term contracts, up to fifteen years, between future offshore wind projects 
and the state’s electricity distributors, if it determines such arrangements 
would be in the best interest of citizens.104 These provisions reflect not 
only the legislature’s understanding that long-term stability is key for 
offshore projects but also the state’s commitment to developing an 
offshore wind industry. 
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The project was contentious. Residents were divided on the project, 
and a federal lawsuit filed by a multitude of plaintiffs unsuccessfully 
attempted to stop it.105 A common complaint in Rhode Island—as in many 
places where wind turbines are erected, both off- and on-shore—was the
aesthetic alteration of the landscape.106 Local critics also raised concerns 
about the project’s funding. Deepwater Wind has a twenty-year contract 
with the regional utility provider National Grid to receive 24 cents per 
KWh, an amount that is not only scheduled to increase over time but that 
is already nearly double the average nation-wide price of 12.3 cents—
meaning that Rhode Islanders are paying more for wind energy.107 Despite 
these complaints, Block Island’s local government, the state government, 
and the Obama administration supported the project.108 Many Block 
Islanders did as well; supporters cited the positive impact of growing 
offshore wind projects on climate change and welcomed a more reliable 
source of energy than the Island’s generators.109
C. State-Level Policies
As the stories of Block Island and Cape Wind illustrate, state policy 
plays a large role in the regulatory framework for developing offshore 
projects. States generally have full control of the first three nautical miles 
off their coasts and have broad authority to control that area under the 
CZMA.110 Thus, states have authority to determine whether to develop 
their nautical area for wind energy production.111 Regardless of states’ 
decisions about offshore wind, projects in federal waters must run cables 
through states’ submerged lands to reach the shore.112 This implicates the 
state’s obligation under the Public Trust Doctrine to “ensure that any 
cabling will not impair the public trust.”113 States that have adopted coastal 
management plans under the CZMA also have the right to determine if a 
“federal authorization,” such as an offshore wind lease, is consistent with 
their plans—therefore, states that have prohibited offshore wind could 
argue that a federally-leased project adjacent to their waters is
inconsistent.114
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State policy also impacts whether the energy has a market to reach. 
PPAs between developers and utility companies are typically “subject to 
approval by the state . . . through a public utility commission.”115 State 
Renewable Portfolio Standards, which mandate the makeup of a state’s 
electricity sources, also impact the demand for offshore wind energy.116
New York, for example, mandated that 50% of the state’s electricity come 
from renewable sources by 2030, and the state plans to use 2.4 GW of 
offshore wind energy to meet that ambitious goal.117
States can also provide the renewable energy incentives and 
obligations needed to advance offshore development. While the Trump 
administration has formally withdrawn from the Paris Agreement,118 non-
federal groups have emerged to uphold the U.S.’s former commitment to 
decreasing carbon emissions by 26% to 28% percent below 2005 levels by 
2025.119 Fifteen states, as well as Puerto Rico and Washington D.C., have 
joined the United States Climate Alliance, which is a commitment to 
uphold the Paris Agreement’s standards and demonstrate state-level action 
toward addressing climate change.120 Many of these states are coastal, so 
offshore wind could become an important part of their strategies—and the 
policies these states craft will determine if the offshore wind industry is 
able to thrive in the U.S.121
IV. THE U.K. OFFSHORE MARKET AND POLICY FRAMEWORK
While the U.S. offshore industry is in its infancy, the U.K. is the 
current world leader in offshore wind production, boasting 6.84 GW of 
total offshore wind capacity, comprising just over 36% of global output.122
The industry is booming, creating 53% of Europe’s new capacity in 
2017.123 The U.K. has both regulatory and geographical advantages that 
make such domination possible.124 The North Sea is shallow, calm, and 
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has wind conditions compatible with current technology. It is also close to 
ports and urban centers, which simplifies construction and makes the 
energy easy to market.125 As for regulation, the U.K.’s stable and 
predictable policy regime makes it a leading country for offshore wind 
investment.126 It also has firm emission-reduction targets as a result of both 
domestic legislation, such as the Climate Change Act of 2008, as well as 
international agreements, such as the Paris Agreement.127
This section will first discuss the U.K.’s policy framework, including 
how siting decisions are made, the nation’s support for technology and 
supply chain development, and the development of their offshore wind 
incentive schemes. It will then look at the impact of the recent Electricity 
Market Reforms on the offshore wind market, with a particular focus on
the U.K.’s record-low offshore wind prices. Lastly, the impact of other 
factors on the U.K. market, including technological advances, a strong 
supply chain, and industry expertise, will be discussed.
A. The U.K. Policy Framework
The Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS), 
which is the central authority for offshore wind policy and law, is the 
primary regulator of the U.K. offshore wind industry.128 The BEIS 
considers larger offshore projects (those over 100 MWs) “nationally 
significant infrastructure projects” which require a “development consent 
order from the Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
Government.”129 Smaller projects (100 MWs or less) require consent from 
the Marine Management Organization (MMO).130
While the BEIS controls policy, the Crown Estate131 owns the 12 
nautical mile territorial limit off the coast of the U.K. and is responsible 
for licensing offshore wind use of the Renewable Energy Zone (REZ), 
which extends out 200 nautical miles.132 This coincides with the Crown
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Estate’s commercial obligation to realize a return on the Marine Estate per 
the Crown Estate Act 1961 and its management purview of electricity 
generation on the continental shelf per the Energy Act 2004.133 The Crown 
Estate has a four-step process for granting rights for an offshore wind farm. 
First, it grants the developer a lease option that is conditioned on the 
securing of all mandatory statutory consents.134 Second, the developer 
goes about meeting the conditions by: conducting “technical and 
environmental studies,” assessing the impact of the project, and consulting 
relevant stakeholders.135 The developer can also perform any additional 
surveys and tests it may wish to conduct related to the viability of the lease 
in this stage.136 Third, after securing the proper consents, the Crown Estate 
grants a lease.137 Lastly, construction and operation of the project 
commence.138
This collection of government agencies (the BEIS, the Crown Estate, 
the MMO, and the Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
Government) is responsible for executing the U.K.’s offshore wind policy 
framework. The following subsections will discuss the U.K. government’s 
policies regarding siting offshore wind projects, supporting technology 
research and development, growing a strong offshore wind supply chain, 
and incentivizing investment in the industry. 
1. Project Siting
Choosing an appropriate site is critical to building a profitable offshore 
wind farm (as Cape Wind and Jim Gordon proved).139 Factors such as wind 
speed, ocean depth, and distance from shore impact the cost of production 
and the return on investment.140 In the U.K., the government determines 
“zones” that developers may utilize for wind farms, in which developers 
select appropriate sites within those areas for the project.141 The 
government leases the zones in rounds to developers.142 This approach 
helps developers avoid contentious negotiations with other users of the 
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offshore area.143 Essentially, the government compresses a portion of the 
regulatory process utilizing its own ocean planning and wind data, which 
shortens the time for developers from obtaining a lease to having an 
operational offshore wind farm in place.144
The Round 3 zone leasing process (the most recent) is illustrative of 
the approach. The Crown Estate conducted an assessment of the habitats 
in the Round 3 zones parallel to the competitive bidding process and in 
compliance with the “U.K. Habitats Regulation.”145 The developers who 
won leases then conducted (or are in the process of conducting) the 
surveys and studies necessary to determine the best location to place their 
project within the lease, accounting for “engineering, economics, and 
environmental factors.”146 When they reach a conclusion, they will 
conduct an environmental impact assessment and then submit an 
application to the National Infrastructure Directorate (NID); the NID will 
then, with stakeholder input, weigh the benefits of the farm against the 
discovered environmental impact and make a recommendation to the 
Department of Energy and Climate Change, which has the ultimate 
decision-making authority.147 Therefore, while the U.K. government
established “dedicated, pre-authorized development zones,” developers 
still bear some burden of navigating bureaucracy to get the farm built.148
However, this does relax the constraints on the ocean space opened for 
development and lowers costs for developers.149
Because the Crown Estate established zones for development, the 
developers do not have to engage with agencies—such as the Ministry of 
Defence, the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, and the 
Department of Transport’s Maritime and Coastguard Agency, among 
others—the approvals process has already been completed for them.150
However, determining appropriate zones requires capturing wind speed 
data offshore, which can be expensive and time consuming to procure.151
Having such data is critical, as it can determine factors such as the stress 
turbines will endure, “the optimum altitude of the nacelle,” and the overall 
success of a zone—knowledge that contributes to both developer and 
investor confidence in a project, which can drop the price of capital.152
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2. Technology and Supply Chain Development
The U.K. invested in both technology research and development, as 
well as supply chain growth, to lower the cost of offshore wind and make 
the market more competitive.153 Developing the investment and 
infrastructure of a strong supply chain requires long-term certainty, as 
these investments have long lifespans and require significant upfront 
capital that may not create a strong return for years.154 The Government 
provides this support not just through a stable regulatory regime, but also 
through building relationships, courting investors, and funding technology 
and supply chain development.
The Carbon Trust’s Offshore Wind Accelerator program and the 
Offshore Renewable Energy (ORE) Catapult both aim to incubate new 
technologies in the industry.155 The Offshore Wind Accelerator program 
works with nine of the industry’s leading developers, all of whom pool 
talent to create solutions in five key areas: “access systems, cable 
installation, electrical systems, foundations, and wake effects and wind 
resource.”156 The Carbon Trust manages the research of these expert 
teams, secures funding, and engages with the offshore industry.157 The
ORE Catapult conducts similar work but engages a broader range of 
stakeholders, supporting small-and-medium-sized enterprises, and it is not 
solely offshore-wind focused.158 Recent projects include studying the 
effects of rain erosion on offshore installations, testing a new cable that 
would double transmission capabilities, and developing a lighter, longer, 
yet more durable blade.159
The U.K.’s supply chain has grown as the country has maintained 
offshore wind targets, but uncertainty causes growth to falter at times.160
The Government addressed this issue in part by investing in an array of 
programs and organizations that aim to build relationships within the 
industry, attract investment, and directly fund expansion. Centres for 
Offshore Renewable Engineering are located in prime offshore wind 
markets in the U.K. and serve two purposes: to connect industry players 
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throughout the nation and to attract foreign investment in the sector.161
GROW:Offshore Wind has nearly £20 million in funding to assist small
and medium-sized enterprises entering the supply chain by providing 
individualized support and investment opportunities.162 The Offshore 
Wind Investment Organization is a subdivision of the U.K’s trade and 
investment body that focuses specifically on expanding the supply chain 
by supporting companies that have “significant potential” to create jobs in 
the industry.163 These organizations, along with a network of other efforts, 
contribute to technology advances and significantly strengthen the 
nation’s offshore supply chain.
3. Incentives
The U.K. has had three main incentive mechanisms for offshore wind 
throughout the years: capital grants, renewables obligations, and contracts 
for difference.164 The government provided capital grants in order to 
generate project proposals and provide a data set that could inform future 
incentives and forecast cost levels.165 Renewables obligations replaced the 
grant system’s financial support for renewable energy and mandated 
utilities to incorporate renewables, like offshore wind, into their 
portfolio—providing the offshore wind energy a steady market.166
Contracts for difference (CfDs), discussed below in Section V(A)(3), have 
been phased in as renewables obligations have been phased out, in order 
to provide developers a consistent, long-term financial foundation for their 
projects.167 This mix of incentives provides the U.K. offshore industry 
with “richer data, longer term certainty, lower risk, and more investible 
offshore wind development opportunities.”168
a. Capital Grants
Capital grants for offshore wind were the U.K.’s first approach to 
incentivizing growth in the industry.169 The grants could cover up to 40% 
of eligible costs, with 75% of the award disbursed upon construction and 
commission of the project and the remainder delivered over a three-year 
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period.170 The program had several goals: to incubate the offshore wind 
industry and develop supply chains; to gather data for the government 
about the costs of offshore projects, in order to better craft future 
incentives programs; to meet national renewables commitments through 
offshore wind generation; and, as always, to realize a return on the 
government’s investment. 171 The U.K.’s ultimate vision was an industry 
that generated carbon-free energy and would not require direct 
government subsidization of projects.172
The scheme selected projects that would not only reflect a diverse set 
of supply chains and technical approaches but would also commit to 
coming online as soon as possible and providing the U.K. electricity for at 
least ten years.173 Projects had to: have at least 20 MW of capacity; already 
possess, or be in negotiations to obtain, a lease from the Crown Estate; 
plan to connect to “a local distribution network or the National Grid;” be 
commissioned within three years; have an independent consultant review 
the project and determine its feasibility; and comply with all relevant 
government statutes.174 Projects were also required to commit to sharing 
information with the government; the U.K. sought to determine “project 
costs, wind speed information, technical barriers and opportunities, 
different commercial arrangements, the effectiveness of consortia 
building, and expected project timelines” in order to determine what a 
“suitable feed-in tariff” would entail.175
In all, the capital grants program made £107 million available to 
producers between 2002 and 2012.176 While experts have widely 
considered this program a success, some criticized it for not being 
ambitious or wide-scale enough and argued it could have spurred growth 
quicker and more broadly throughout the industry.177
b. Renewables Obligations
The U.K. replaced the capital grants program with a Renewables 
Obligation program in 2002.178 Projects that received grants had to pay 
back the capital, plus interest, in order to take advantage of the new 
incentive, resulting in nearly £50 million being returned to the 
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government.179 The program has three functions: to incentivize producers 
and to simultaneously obligate and incentivize utilities to use more 
renewable energy.180 This scheme obligates energy utilities to generate a
percentage of their portfolio from renewables, starting at 3% in 2002.181
The government increases the percentage each year, most recently settling 
at 46.8% for 2018-19.182 The government awards Renewable Obligation 
Certificates, or “ROCs,” to producers per MWh of renewable energy 
generated; the ROCs can be bought and sold, and may be used to satisfy a 
utility’s annual renewables obligation.183 The ROCs are “essentially . . . a 
price support mechanism” that intends to pass on the benefit to producers, 
who can directly sell or auction the ROCs.184 Utilities that cannot cover 
their amount pay into a “buy-out fund,” which is distributed annually to 
all utilities reflective of the percentage of total ROCs they contributed that 
year—so if a utility submits 5% of that year’s ROCs, they would receive 
5% of the fund.185 Thus, the buy-out price equals the price of an ROC for 
that period, which is also set by the government yearly.186
As ROC prices have increased over time, utilities have benefitted 
financially from providing more renewable energy.187 However, the 2002 
version of the program effectively limited investment in less-developed 
industries, such as offshore wind, due to their higher cost.188 To account 
for this, in 2009 the U.K. altered the program to provide more support to 
less-established technologies, including designating offshore wind to 
receive two ROCs per MWh (compared to one and a half for technologies 
like “dedicated biomass,” and one ROC for onshore wind).189 The program 
is periodically adjusted to account for further nuanced bands of 
technologies and to reflect developments in different markets.190
The renewables obligation has not been a resounding success for the 
U.K. Renewable production has only reached about “two-thirds of 
targeted levels,” suggesting the scheme has failed to adequately 
incentivize renewable energy.191 The system has also failed to be 
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predictable. Because both the ROC benefit and the wholesale price of 
electricity fluctuate due to market forces, there is always uncertainty about 
what the bottom line for producers will be per MWh.192 Policy makers 
anticipated that utilities, who in the U.K. are often producers as well, 
would best predict future electricity prices; but, fears of market volatility 
due to external factors, like shale gas depressing the wholesale electricity 
price, made renewable projects risky investments.193 Also, because 
utilities, and not producers, redeem the ROCs, utilities have used their 
bargaining power to force non-utility producers to accept discounted 
energy prices—resulting in “as little as 70% of the ROC value” being 
passed to the producers.194 Ultimately, the ROC system has not provided 
predictability and certainty to investors, and thus failed to substantially 
lower the cost of capital for offshore projects.195 In March 2017, the 
contracts for difference feed-in tariff began to phase in, while the ROC 
scheme began to phase out.196 While the program runs until 2037 under 
statutory obligation, no new renewables projects may take part in the 
scheme, and government support will essentially remain as-is until 
completely shut down.197
B. Electricity Market Reforms and the U.K. Price Drop
In 2013, the U.K. enacted the Electricity Market Reform (EMR), a set 
of energy policies aimed at lowering costs, increasing energy 
independence, driving investment, and meeting climate change goals.198
The reforms had four “pillars:” contracts for difference (CfD), a carbon 
price floor, an emissions performance standard, and a capacity 
mechanism.199 The carbon price floor and the emissions performance 
standard functioned primarily to drive the U.K.’s carbon emissions goals 
and clearly established that the nation no longer supported growth in the 
coal industry.200
While the EMR had impacts in both the renewable and non-renewable 
sector, addressing non-renewable energy costs was a primary function of 
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the reforms.201 The U.K. government recognized that fuel costs heavily 
influence non-renewable energy costs, and that the “electricity market was 
designed to operate under the assumption that each MWh of electricity has 
a fuel cost”—which effectively means that fuel costs overwhelmingly 
impact the price of electricity.202 Renewables, on the other hand, require a 
significant amount of capital upfront but have no on-going fuel costs.203
Because of this, renewable electricity prices are not driven by fuel costs.204
Investors thus need some form of mechanism to judge their return on a 
renewable investment, both in the short and long term.205
The CfD model intends to stabilize the renewable energy prices in the 
long term, thus reducing the risk of investment and ensuring an electricity 
price that makes investment in technology like offshore wind attractive.206
Producers bid on fifteen-year contracts by proposing a “strike price” per
MWh. If the strike price is above the reference wholesale electricity price, 
the government covers the difference, and if lower, the producer feeds
those profits back to the government.207 The program also aims to protect 
consumers by limiting the opportunity for financial windfall without the 
public receiving a payback.208 The “money for . . . CfD top-up[s] is sourced 
from a levy on consumers’ electricity bills, which is pooled by [the U.K.] 
government and used to fund various low carbon electricity support 
mechanisms.”209 The program also includes a “Levy Control Framework,”
which is designed to control costs by capping spending on the program.210
While some predicted such a cap would lead to less deployment of 
renewable energy sources than would occur without such a limit, it was 
necessary from a political perspective to stop the cost from being passed 
on to consumers through energy price hikes.211
The CfD model did not initially produce lower-cost offshore projects. 
The first administered contracts included an offshore wind project priced 
at £140 per MWh—nearly three times the cost of combined cycle gas 
turbine energy at the time.212 Opinions at the time were split, with the 
auction results stoking arguments that offshore wind is too expensive as a 
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zero-carbon alternative.213 However, the program was a success—
renewable production surged, and, in the second round of CfD auctions in 
September 2017, the government secured a record low of £57.50 ($75.86) 
per MWh for projects slated to come online in 2022-23.214 This price 
represents 57% more offshore output for 44% less subsidy than the initial 
round.215 Fifty percent of the supply chain value is expected to go to U.K.
businesses, which was another big win for the government.216 As costs 
continue dropping, offshore wind is increasingly within striking distance 
of the U.K.’s average £47 per MWh wholesale energy rate.217
However, there are concerns that recent price drops might be more of 
a mirage than a reality. The contracts are based on the costs of turbines 
and other components dropping at an anticipated rate, and those decreases 
could potentially not materialize.218 Brexit could also cause the pound to 
drop, increasing the cost of importing components.219 These costs, 
particularly for offshore farms the size of those that recently won 
contracts, would be huge, and may not be able to offset the government 
subsidies to bring these projects into the black.220 The gap in the energy 
supply from such large projects not materializing would be equally 
huge.221 There are also concerns that a few large developers who have 
achieved the necessary economies of scale and pushed out smaller 
developers could result in government subsidies going to a small pool, 
increasing chances of collusion or abuse of the system.222
C. Other Factors Impacting U.K. Price Drop
The EMR heavily influenced the low price of the recent CfD contracts, 
but the U.K.’s other policies had a noticeable impact on creating an 
environment that would support such low prices. The three projects—
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Triton Knoll, Hornsea Two, and Moray223—will benefit from 
technological advances, a stronger supply chain, and the industry’s learned 
expertise. 224 These factors are likely to assist prices in continuing to drop.
The projects are likely to use larger turbines, as have recent U.K. 
projects, that could generate up to 8 MW per turbine.225 Turbine capacity 
is predicted to continue to grow, with estimates in the 13 to 15 MW range 
by 2024.226 The larger a turbine is, the more power is generated from each 
installation, resulting in more MW produced per installation and per dollar 
spent.227 Since 2007, turbine capacity has nearly doubled, and is predicted 
to double again by 2020.228
The projects are also slated to be huge, which will result in further 
economies of scale—Moray will have 950 MW of capacity, Triton Knoll 
will have 860 MW, and Hornsea Two will have 1,386 MW, which very 
well may be the largest offshore project in the world when it goes online.229
Ørsted claims the ideal size for a cost-effective offshore farm is “800 to 
1,500 MW.”230 As projects get bigger, “supply chain efficiencies, greater 
purchasing power,” and operations and maintenance savings increase as 
well.231 As the supply chain in the U.K. has grown, competition has grown 
as well, lowering costs further.232 The increased demand from offshore 
producers provides them with more bargaining power with their suppliers 
as well.233
The projects will also benefit from experience. There are existing 
industry supports and infrastructure for offshore wind in the U.K. to 
support the construction and maintenance efforts, and investors are 
experienced (and thus comfortable with) making offshore wind 
investments.234 The project sites’ close proximity to skilled labor, 
products, and services that can be easily deployed have “cost saving 
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implications.”235 This experience also helps projects come online quicker. 
The most recent contracts, which should be producing within five years, 
will have less down time and more production per investment dollar (or 
pound) for the project.236 As producers gain more experience in building 
offshore wind farms in the U.K., they naturally better understand the risks 
of certain areas and are better equipped to address those risks by making 
wiser technology choices suited for the geographic region.237
Even some of the downsides to these projects have silver linings. The 
project sites are farther out, as much of the optimal, near-shore lease areas 
are already occupied.238 Being farther out comes with costs: running 
farther transmission lines, longer travel times between the shore and the 
project site, and dealing with deeper waters.239 However, being farther 
from shore is likely to provide stronger and more steady winds, which will 
benefit production.240
V. COMPARISON: WHAT LESSONS COULD THE U.S. LEARN?
The U.K. has successfully grown what was once a niche energy 
market into an economic engine. Its policies have hit on a few key areas: 
a reliable incentive and policy framework, a strong supply chain, and a 
streamlined permitting process.241 On the other hand, the U.S. has an 
offshore industry frequently described as “nascent.”242 The U.S.’s policy 
framework has yet to produce an offshore wind farm in federal waters due 
to a variety of obstacles.243 The federal regulatory framework creates long 
lead times for development and provides unstable incentives; the market 
lacks economies of scale and a strong supply chain.244 These factors 
increase the price of a project and delay a return on investment.245 The 
U.S.’s offshore wind market also has to compete with plentiful, low-cost 
natural gas resources, as well as other low-cost renewables such as on-
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shore wind, in an energy market that is not structured to value the “climate, 
health, [or] ecological” costs of energy production.246
The U.K.’s approach, and its trial and error, could inform the U.S.’s 
potential policy moves as part of the administration’s “all-of-the-above 
energy policy,” or the states’ approach to developing an offshore wind 
industry.247 The policy options laid out below will consider 
implementation options on both the federal and state level, as the political 
landscapes, and thus the chances of implementation, are vastly different. 
First, creating reliable incentives through direct investment, renewables 
obligations, and contracts for difference will be discussed, followed by 
supply chain development policies, and lastly, ideas for streamlining the 
permitting process. 
A. Reliable Incentives
The U.S.’s offshore wind policy framework lacks stable incentives. 
Congress has implemented federal tax incentives sporadically, and the 
current iteration of the PTC and ITC248 are both winding down as their 
December 31, 2019 termination approaches. At this point, no offshore 
wind farms are under construction that will benefit from the incentive, 
although several are in the pipeline and likely seeking to break ground 
before the deadline.249 The government offers loan guarantees, but 
developers have underutilized them (making the incentive unsuccessful); 
grants are available, though the programs typically are not aimed 
specifically at wind production or only apply to small segments of the 
market (such as rural areas).250 The results of U.S. incentives speak for 
themselves.
The U.K. has learned, through trial and error, that incentive and policy 
regimes need to provide “reasonable certainty over a 10-15 year period”
in order to properly motivate developers.251 The U.K. has taken a few 
approaches to incentive programs, beginning with capital grants when the 
industry was in its infancy, shifting to renewables obligations to build a 
more renewable-dependent energy market, and most recently settling on 
the CfD model in order to provide much-needed stability. The U.S. and 
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state governments should take a similar long-term view of incentive 
policies and should implement a direct investment program, mandate 
renewable energy consumption, and possibly implement CfDs to better 
incorporate state markets in the offshore leasing process.
1. Direct Investment
A broad direct investment program would be the most powerful 
incentive, as shown by the success of the U.K.’s capital grants scheme. 
The capital grants scheme was criticized, in hindsight, for not being broad 
enough. The U.S. should learn from this lesson, and broaden the existing 
grant programs to include a wider array of business sizes, development 
approaches, and industry roles (including developers, manufacturers, and 
technology producers). Such an investment would likely recoup itself, if 
at least partially, through lower-cost projects, increased energy output, and 
a stronger supply chain.252 Such a program does not feel realistic for the 
federal government (although Congress should alternatively approve the 
PTC and ITC for a fifteen-year minimum period). On the state level, 
particularly in climate-conscious states, such a program could drive strong 
growth in the offshore wind industry.
2. Renewables Obligations
A renewables obligation would help create a larger market for offshore 
wind energy but is extremely unlikely to materialize at the federal level 
under the current administration. The U.K. also did not find much success 
with this approach, as their market-based system was not predictable 
enough for the long lead times of offshore wind.253 The system was also 
flawed in that utilities, not developers or producers, redeemed the ROCs; 
utilities were able to exert their superior bargaining position to obtain the 
ROCs below cost, passing less of the financial benefit on to those carrying 
the financial burden of an offshore project.
States are already moving to implement similar obligations. Most 
states have a renewable portfolio standard, such as Rhode Island’s RES,254
that mandates a portion of the state’s energy come from renewable 
sources.255 Rhode Island stands apart, however, for mandating that utilities 
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purchase offshore wind to meet these goals. While this requirement 
stabilizes the market, it would be overly ambitious to suggest every state 
adopt similar regulations given the “host of challenges” associated with 
bringing an offshore farm to reality.256 Maryland and New Jersey are in 
the process of implementing a market-based system identical to the U.K.’s 
program:257 offshore wind renewable energy certificates (ORECs) would 
be earned by developers per KWh, and bought by utilities to meet their 
renewables obligation.258 These states should be wary of avoiding the U.K. 
system’s pitfalls, although the smaller pool of developers and utilities 
within the individual states may decrease bargaining power issues, 
allowing developers to reap the financial benefits. They should also focus 
on stabilizing the price for an OREC, so that the program does not suffer 
from the instability of market swings as the U.K. program did.
3. Contracts for Difference 
The U.K.’s CfD model appears ripe for replication, as it provides a 
long-term incentive to developers, protections for consumers, and could 
result in no-subsidy contracts in the near future. If not on the national level, 
states could implement similar programs and award contracts that 
developers could peddle to the BOEM as part of their offshore lease 
bids.259 This would solve a huge gap in the U.S.’s current system, which 
partly originates from the replication of offshore oil and gas leasing 
policies. The two energy sources are quite different—unlike offshore oil 
and gas, which enters a globalized market, offshore-generated electricity 
enters localized state markets.260 States, however, are not involved in 
vetting developers or their bids for federal offshore wind leases.261 The 
result is that leases are awarded to developers who can provide the highest 
return for the federal government, without considering what the price will 
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be for consumers or whether developers will be able to play nice with state 
utilities.262
A replication of the CfD scheme could ease some of this friction by 
involving the state utilities in the bidding process and partly shifting the 
focus to the price consumers will pay for the energy. States could set up 
government-owned corporations to play the middle-man between 
developers and utilities. These corporations would enter the CfD with a 
developer, gather payments from utilities for the top-up pool, make 
payments to developers when the market price in the state falls below the 
strike price, and recoup money from developers when the strike price is 
exceeded. The states could run auctions as the U.K. does when offering 
leases in their own waters. 
Incorporating the BOEM could possibly present issues, but would still 
be doable. One potential method could allow states that are markets for a 
federal offshore wind lease to hold a bidding process parallel to the 
BOEM’s own auction. Interested developers would first submit proposals 
to the BOEM, who would then determine what developers may participate 
in a parallel state CfD auction. The BOEM-vetted developers would make 
strike price bids to the state corporations, who would award the CfDs to 
the lowest bidder. The winner could then use the CfD as part of their 
BOEM lease proposal, with the BOEM ultimately leasing to the state bid 
winner (absent extreme extenuating circumstances). This way, the BOEM 
could consider the price to consumers in its process, ensure the lease-
holder has a market for their energy, and ultimately retain control over the 
leasing decision. 
Unfortunately, CfDs may violate federal law, although the legality of 
their use for the above-described purpose is unclear. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission places restrictions on “over-the-counter financial 
instruments,” which prohibits the trading of CfDs.263 Therefore, if the 
CfDs created as described are not traded, they may not violate federal law. 
However, if they were found to violate current law, the Trump 
administration may be open to rolling back the rule given its focus on de-
regulation. Many countries allow CfDs to be traded—they are not unique 
to the U.K., or renewable energy sources, although the U.K. has utilized 
them for that purpose.264 Their use in the U.S. to provide long-term, 
reliable incentives for renewable energy could be a huge win for the 
offshore wind industry.
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B. Supply Chain Development
The U.K. has built a strong supply chain by deliberately courting 
investors, directly investing in supply chain manufacturers, and investing 
in technology research and development.265 However, their supply chain 
has also benefitted from the steady stream of projects, which was again 
supported by a reliable policy framework. The U.S., on the other hand, has 
been shown to have the manufacturing capacity and efficiency to support 
an offshore wind industry;266 however, as described throughout this 
Article, it lacks the long-term policy focus that attracts investors. The U.S. 
supply chain faces the classic ‘chicken or the egg’ issue—manufacturers 
cannot reasonably enter the market without projects to purchase their 
goods; developers and investors hesitate to invest in offshore wind because 
the costs are high, partly due to an undeveloped supply chain and a lack of 
economies of scale.
The U.S.’s investment in technology research and development is a 
nice start, but crafting a strong supply chain will require more action. As 
leases are awarded and projects move closer to development, the U.S.
could do more to solicit investment in the offshore wind supply chain. The 
U.K.’s Centers for Offshore Renewable Engineering is a replicable idea 
and could be used to connect states pushing offshore wind as well as attract 
investment. States with strong offshore oil and gas supply chains could be 
good targets for such a program. Manufacturers in the offshore oil and gas 
industry are already beginning to diversify, as Bay State Wind has 
partnered with German-based EEW and Louisiana-based Gulf Island 
Fabrication to produce monopile foundations and transition pieces to 
support the offshore wind efforts in the Northeast.267 The combination may 
produce up to 1,700 jobs.268 A program to help build business relationships 
such as this, whether administered by the federal government, the states, 
or by a state-consortium, could help drive investment in the offshore wind 
supply chain.
C. Streamline the Permitting Process
The U.S. permitting process for offshore wind is a maze that 
contributes to long lead times and raises the cost of projects. In the U.K., 
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the Crown Estate determines zones suitable for wind farms, and then 
auctions off those leases. Essentially, the government handles habitat and 
ocean planning functions, while the developer must conduct an 
environmental impact study for the ultimate site they select for the project. 
The developer only has to clear the National Infrastructure Directorate and 
the Department of Energy and Climate Change, but avoids interfacing with 
the Ministry of Defence, the Department of Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs, Department of Transport’s Maritime and Coastguard Agency, and 
others; the government has already handled those approval processes.269
The BOEM conducts a similar analysis to the Crown Estate upon 
awarding a lease, and it engages with relevant agencies and state 
intergovernmental task forces (if the state has one). However, the 
developer/lessee then must interface with the Coast Guard, the Army 
Corps of Engineers, the Navy, NOAA, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the 
EPA, FERC, etc.270 This process needs to be streamlined and push some 
of the permitting load from the developer to the BOEM, as the U.K. 
framework does.
While it is important that offshore wind developers comply with 
federal law and that federal agencies exercise their authority over the 
process, the reality is the long lead time kills investment. These projects 
are already capital and time intensive, so the federal government, in order 
to incentivize offshore wind production, should cut down hurdles where 
possible. This process is already under way, as the Department of Interior 
has committed to reducing “unnecessarily burdensome regulations.”271
This commitment has already borne fruit: The Department of the Interior 
announced the “One Federal Decision” framework in April 2018, which 
establishes a single project permitting schedule, allows for concurrent 
project review, and will result in a single environmental impact statement 
and decision.272 The memorandum of understanding between the agencies 
will apply to all federal project approvals.273 The BOEM has also proposed 
guidelines that would loosen the approval of construction and operations 
plans by allowing developers to submit a range of plans for approval.274
This would allow developers to clear BOEM review without committing 
to a specific design, which will speed up the process by pushing off 
developers’ decision making and give developers flexibility in 
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construction. These policies, if enacted with fidelity, should work wonders 
for the permitting process.
CONCLUSION
The U.K.’s policy framework helped their offshore wind industry 
become the most powerful in the world. The U.S. could easily replicate a 
few key policy ideas in order to strengthen its own offshore wind industry. 
The most critical policy shift is long-term support for the industry, which 
should be expressed in all levels of the policy framework. Reliable 
investment incentives are crucial, and could be driven by state- or federal-
level direct investment programs, renewables obligations, or a contracts 
for difference model. The U.S. supply chain, which is ripe for growth, 
should be supported and supplied with a steady stream of projects to court 
investors in the nation’s manufacturing capacity. Lastly, efforts to 
streamline the permitting process are under way, and should be 
continuously monitored for effectiveness. The U.S. offshore wind industry 
is on the precipice of greatness, and with these lessons from abroad, could 
become the next great American success story. 
